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Introduction
following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of april 20, 2010,1 oil
companies filed several suits against the Department of the interior
(Doi or interior) for various dimensions of alleged government
misconduct surrounding attempts to regulate private offshore drilling
in the gulf of mexico. Hornbeck Offshore Services, LLC v. Salazar is one of
several such cases challenging the Doi’s response,2 which included a
moratorium in may 2010 halting offshore drilling in the gulf of mexico
* american University Washington College of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2014; emory University,
B.a., 2011. i would like to thank Judge Jennifer Walker elrod for her patience in helping me
improve my writing. Judge elrod, the product that follows is an imperfect attempt to follow the
guidelines and standards you set for my work last summer, and i will undoubtedly be a better
advocate for having learned from you and your clerks. thanks are also due to the board and staff
of the Legislation & Policy Brief at american University for their careful editing and suggestions.
Finally, i am grateful to my family and friends for their support throughout the writing process,
and for challenging me to live up to my responsibilities as a brother, son, and boyfriend while
tending to my life as a law student; thanks for reminding me how much i need both.
1
See generally Campbell robertson & Clifford Krauss, Oil Rig Sinks, Raising Fears Of a Major Spill
in the Gulf, N.Y. times, apr. 23, 2010, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res
=9400e7De113eF930a15757C0a9669D8B63; Laura margonelli, A Spill of Our Own, N.Y. times,
may 2, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/opinion/02margonelli.html; stephen
Power, Judge Overturns Drilling Ban, Wall st. J., Jun. 22, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/sB10001424052748704853404575322942341022322.html.
2
see, e.g., gulf restoration Network, inc. v. salazar, 683 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2012) (challenging
interior’s approval of drilling permits following the oil spill); Defenders of Wildlife v. Bureau of
ocean energy mgmt., regulation, enforcement, No. 0-0254-Ws-C, 2012 WL 1640676 (s.D. ala.
may 8, 2012) (seeking declaratory judgment against interior for leases granted following the oil
spill); ensco offshore Co. v. salazar, 781 F. supp. 2d 332 (e.D. La. 2011) (challenging interior’s
moratorium on offshore drilling activities following the oil spill).
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after the “catastrophic”3 Deepwater Horizon oil spill.4 Several companies
engaged in offshore drilling challenged DOI’s moratorium in federal
district court on June 7, 2010.5 Judge Feldman of the Eastern District
of Louisiana issued a preliminary injunction on June 22, 2010 staying
the effects of the moratorium, finding that the public interest, the
degree of harm to the local economy, and the availability of domestic
energy warranted a preliminary injunction allowing the thirty-three oil
companies, and those similarly situated, to resume offshore drilling.6
DOI appealed the court’s injunction against its moratorium. While that
appeal was pending, Secretary of the Interior Kenneth Salazar testified
at a Senate subcommittee hearing that the moratorium remained in
effect.7 Pursuant to the literal terms of the injunction, DOI repealed
the initial moratorium but replaced it with a substantially identical
one, despite Judge Feldman’s order staying enforcement of the initial
moratorium.8 In August 2012, the district court found DOI in contempt
after the agency refused to materially comply with the stay of the
moratorium and required DOI to pay more than $500,000 in attorneys’
fees for the extended litigation stemming from DOI’s behavior.9
Protracted litigation followed, culminating in hearings for oral
argument before the Fifth Circuit on August 8, 2012.10 On November 27,
2012, a majority of the Fifth Circuit panel reversed the district court’s
contempt finding, and in doing so criticized the injunction for failing
to clearly set out that its purpose was to prevent the resumption of
operations until further court order.11 Setting aside the machinations for
Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Salazar Calls for New Safety Measures for
Offshore Oil and Gas Operations; Orders Six Month Moratorium on Deepwater Drilling (May
27, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Calls-for-New-SafetyMeasures-for-Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Operations-Orders-Six-Month-Moratorium-on-DeepwaterDrilling.cfm (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
4
The original texts of the Notice to Lessees regarding the moratorium are available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/MORATORIUM_NTL.pdf (last visited Feb. 9,
2013). The Department of Interior (DOI) is an executive agency, and its authorization for issuing
such a moratorium can be found at 30 C.F.R. 250.172(b), which is authorized by 30 U.S.C. § 1751
(2012), 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (2012), and 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012).
5
Hornbeck Offshore Servs., LLC v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 627 (E.D. La. 2010).
6
Id. at 639.
7
Minerals Mgmt. Serv. Reorganization Hearing Before S. Appropriations Comm., Interior, Env’t. &
Related Agencies Subcomm., 111th Cong., 21–22 (June 23, 2010) available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg57214/pdf/CHRG-111shrg57214.pdf [hereinafter Senate Minerals
Reorganization Hearing].
8
Plaintiff-Appellees’ Original Brief at 2–3, Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696
F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010).
9
Opening Brief for the Defendants at 2, Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, No. 1130936, 2012 WL 1029835 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2012).
10
Audio recording: Oral arguments in re: Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, No. 1130936 (5th Cir. Aug. 8, 2012), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgumentRecordings.
aspx.
11
Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 701 F.3d 810, 818 (5th Cir. 2012).
3
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reviewing a finding of civil contempt, what makes the circumstances
of Hornbeck so unique is the narrowness by which the Fifth Circuit is
willing to construe its own judicial power in contrast with how much
latitude it gives to the Executive Branch and its related agencies to
continue pursuing controversial policies.12
The term “nonacquiescence” describes the gap between an adverse
court ruling and an agency policy that allows for continued agency
activity inconsistent with that ruling.13 Only a federal statute or an
opinion from the Supreme Court can close this gap.14 The limited scope
by which the judiciary can forcibly align agency actions with judicial
decisions has remained constant, despite a relative explosion in agency
involvement in national citizen-state interaction.15 Over the last sixty
years, agencies have been the primary movers in deciding several key
constitutional issues and their applicability to large-scale government
programs.16 Beginning in the 1980s, courts began taking active measures
to curb intracircuit nonacquiescence. Hornbeck departs substantially
from the historical backdrop of nonacquiescence; administrative
agencies have traditionally abided by district court injunctions,
but in Hornbeck DOI chose to pursue its own policy over the stay in
See id. at 825 (Elrod, J., dissenting) (“The court’s power to enforce its orders must remain intact,
even in the midst of the most critical emergencies of the state. Simply put, the Judiciary may be
the least dangerous branch, but it is not entirely toothless.”).
13
See id. Agency nonacquiescence can be characterized as “intercircuit” when a given agency
refuses to apply a circuit court decision to agency activity in another circuit’s jurisdiction, or
“intracircuit” when that agency refuses to apply the holding to its activity in the issuing circuit’s
jurisdiction. See id. at 694. Compare Matter of Waldei, 19 I. & N. Dec. 189, 193 (B.I.A. 1984) (“[A]s
we do not agree with the court’s interpretation, we decline to follow the holding of Yiu Sing Chun
v. Sava, [] outside of the Second Circuit.”) (internal citation omitted), with Hillhouse v. Harris, 715
F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983) (“The result of this individual case should not obscure the fact that the
regulations of HHS are not the supreme law of the land. ‘It is, emphatically, the province and duty
of the judicial department, to say what the law is,’ and the Secretary will ignore that principle at
his peril.”) (internal citation omitted).
14
See Estreicher & Revesz, infra note 17, at 681 n.1 (noting that lower federal courts clearly have
the authority to issue binding decisions on the dispute at issue, and that acquiescence focuses on
the unwillingness of agencies to apply such a decision to subsequent internal proceedings).
15
See, e.g., Heckler v. Cheney, 470 U.S. 821, 854 (1985) (“The problem of agency refusal to act is
one of the pressing problems of the modern administrative state, given the enormous powers,
for both good and ill, that agency inaction, like agency action, holds over citizens.”); Gillian E.
Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law As Constitutional Common Law, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 479,
489 (2010) (discussing the modern administrative state, “in which rulemaking is pervasive and
agencies exercise broad discretion in devising requirements that can have a substantial impact on
identified groups”) (internal citation omitted).
16
See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1499–500 (9th Cir. 1984) (issuing a circuit-wide injunction
ordering the Social Security Administration to restore benefits payments), vacated on other grounds,
469 U.S. 1082 (1984); Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of
New Deal Administrative Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 399, 438 (2007) (referencing N.L.R.B. v. Federbush
Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941)) (“[Judge Learned] Hand stayed within the role that courts had
been assigned by New Deal-era legal theorists. He left any say over whether the First Amendment
was violated or not to the experts at the NLRB.”).
12
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enforcement ordered by the Eastern District Court of Louisiana.17
If this expanded application of nonacquiescence gains broader
application in federal courts, two consequences will result. The first
is a kind of moral hazard: agencies will craft bolder, more aggressive
policies if armed with the knowledge that those policies can still be
applied despite adverse court decisions. Second, and relatedly, by
adopting such a narrow conception of its own reviewing power vis-àvis agency behavior, the federal judiciary will cede an indeterminable
amount of its own oversight authority with equally indeterminable
consequences for future plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether intracircuit agency
nonacquiescence18 is constitutional, and until the Court addresses
that question, clashes between the federal judiciary and agency
administrators are likely to continue. Commentators are divided as to
how likely it is that the Supreme Court will take up the constitutional
arguments. Proponents of intracircuit nonacquiescence argue that nonconstitutional means can address the concerns regarding the practice,
and opponents argue that the lack of a definitive response from the
Court on the constitutional arguments that would address how to
resolve the tension between the executive and judiciary branches
makes the conflict intractable.19
Two main factors, if present, can soften a reviewing court’s
response to agency nonacquiescence. Courts have found that, in
certain circumstances, public policy may necessitate some degree of
nonacquiescence in order to preserve the continuity of agency impact
across its national jurisdiction. The first of these is venue uncertainty,
which occurs when an agency is necessarily exposed to review in
multiple courts by virtue of its authorizing statute.20 The second is
See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies,
98 Yale L.J. 679, 681 n.1 (1989) (“Agencies have accepted, of course, the authority of the lower
federal courts to enter rulings that are binding resolutions of the particular dispute between the
parties before the court.”).
18
Intracircuit nonacquiescence is the term used by courts and academics to describe cases in
which the agency in question chooses not to adhere to a circuit court decision relating to an agency
policy in that circuit court’s jurisdiction. Intercircuit nonacquiescence is generally regarded
as more controversial than refusal to apply decisions from other less proximate circuit courts,
especially when venue choice or uncertainty does not exist.
19
Compare Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 17, at 683, with Coenen, infra note 28, at 1359.
20
Compare Maranville, infra note 67, at 494 (discussing the broad authorizing statutes of certain
agencies, like the NLRB, FTC and IRS, which give claimants a choice of courts in which to
adjudicate their claims, necessarily creating uncertainty about in which court these agencies will
be called to defend agency policy) with Coenen, infra note 28, at 1349 (“If benefits are denied
both by frontline claims evaluators and by higher-level SSA officials responsible for reviewing
denials, an appeal lies solely to the local district court and, from that court, to the regional court
of appeals. Thus, Social Security decision makers can determine readily which circuit court has
17
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the uniform administration21 of agency policy, like the IRS’s desire to
uniformly administer the tax code despite differing interpretations of
its provisions across circuits.22
Although neither the government nor the oil companies that filed
suit in Hornbeck have explicitly raised the issue, the outcome of this
case has fundamental implications for the scope of the doctrine of
nonacquiescence.23 If, as the Fifth Circuit held in its November 2012
opinion,24 agencies are only bound by the narrow and literal language
of an injunction, the space in which an agency can operate in opposition
to a disadvantageous judicial order or opinion is much greater than
the two discrete circumstances that have been historically recognized
as justifiable. Consequently, this will also expand the sheer number of
individuals affected by the agency policy in question, and similarly
situated non-parties will not only no longer be able to rely on favorable
outcomes in court to vindicate their rights, but the government may
be able to use estoppel-based defenses to preclude those parties from
filing a similar suit. This set of outcomes would be a tremendous power
swing in favor of administrative agencies.
The current state of nonacquiescence jurisprudence allows agencies
to limit the application of court decisions to minimize the impact on
administrative policy, as long as the measures implementing that
policy are within the statutory bounds of that agency’s purview. As
the circumstances of Hornbeck underscore, until the Supreme Court
addresses whether such nonacquiescence is constitutional and, if so,
what the boundaries are, there remains an impermissibly large gap in
available remedies for similarly situated plaintiffs affected by agency
policy in the same jurisdiction. Part I of this Article discusses the
traditional bases for nonacquiescence, and finds that the circumstances
of Hornbeck fall well outside the narrow policy reasons for which
courts have allowed nonacquiescence in the past. Part II of this Article
surveys the relevant nonacquiescence case law that has developed
review authority over any particular claimant’s case.”).
21
Uniformity can be further subdivided and understood in terms of horizontal (similar treatment
at the agency level of all claimants similarly situated) or vertical (similar treatment in the same
geographic area of all claimants similarly situated). See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 17, at 695.
22
See Lopez, 725 F.2d at 1503 n.12 (describing the Internal Revenue Service’s use of nonacquiescence).
23
There are hundreds of federal agencies that operate in the United States with very different
styles and purviews, and it is inherently difficult to apply generalizations about agency behavior
uniformly to all actors. The distinction between executive and independent agencies is also a
separate topic of legal academic discourse, but not strictly relevant to this discussion. See generally
Donald W. Crowley, Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: Does the Type of Agency
Matter?, 40 W. Pol. Q. 265, 265–83 (1987); “Federal Agencies & Commissions,” The White House,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-government/federal-agencies-and-commissions (last visited
Mar. 25, 2013).
24
See Hornbeck Offshore Servs. v. Salazar, 710 F.3d 810 (5th Cir. 2012).
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since the 1980s, and analyzes the major themes these cases contribute
to the issues underlying the parties’ dispute in Hornbeck. Furthermore,
Part II explains that although agencies have at times refused to apply
circuit court decisions within the jurisdiction of that circuit court,
appellate judges have harshly criticized this type of noncompliance as
an impermissible substitute for judicial review.25
Part III then describes the circumstances of the Hornbeck litigation,
focusing on DOI’s use of two substantively identical moratoria to
circumvent the district court’s injunction. Part III also asserts that, on a
practical level, the continued expansion of nonacquiescence implicated
by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hornbeck would improperly expand
the doctrine of nonacquiescence and remove a key piece of the ability
of the judiciary to check agency behavior.
Finally, Part IV recommends a legislative response or timely
Supreme Court review, and concludes that either would be an effective
answer to the unbalanced state of power relations between the judiciary
and federal administrative agencies at present. As it stands, and as
the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Hornbeck underscores and indeed
amplifies, agencies are afforded too much power to continue pursuing
policy objectives without meaningful judicial review. This Article
concludes that definitive action should preempt a broader application
of the Fifth Circuit’s overly narrow construction of its own judicial
power to avoid creating safety for agency administrators to craft overly
aggressive policies, as well as to prevent judicial review of said policies
from being so lax as to make potential plaintiffs’ remedies (e.g. specific
performance) effectively unenforceable.
I. Traditional Policy Arguments in Favor of Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence
Nonacquiescence is the continued pursuit of a given agency policy
in the face of an adverse court decision dictating a change to how that
policy is administered. Intercircuit nonacquiescence refers to applying
a policy in contravention to a decision from another circuit, whereas
intracircuit nonacquiescence takes place when an agency continues to
apply a condemned policy within the circuit issuing the adverse order.
For nonacquiescence generally, and intracircuit nonacquiescence in
particular, uniformity of administration of agency regulations is the
predominant, consequential argument advanced by agencies in favor
See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 17, at 681 (“[D]espite occasional judicial criticism,
nonacquiescence persisted without either legitimation or interdiction by Congress or the Supreme
Court.”).
25
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of nonacquiescence.26 In the intercircuit context this argument seems
plausible in that it may be impractical for an agency to adjust its practice
according to different circuit court interpretations, some of which may
even conflict.27 To follow the letter and spirit of conflicting decisions
issued by different circuit courts would mean applying the policy of
the agency differently to otherwise similarly situated persons based
solely on the appellate jurisdiction in which they live. This would
necessarily undermine the agency’s goal of uniformity with respect
to policy administration.28 However, the assumption that intracircuit
nonacquiescence will advance national uniformity is faulty in all but
the most exceptional circumstance where a reviewing court departs
from established precedent.29
In Hornbeck, uniform application of DOI’s policy is not at issue
because, although other offshore drilling operations take place in
Alaska and along the East Coast, the triggering environmental event
giving rise to the moratoria, all of the plaintiffs and all of the associated
activity are located in the Gulf of Mexico and therefore within the
Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction.30 DOI issued the moratorium on May 20,
2010 (hereinafter the May Directive). By continuing to advance the
interests of the May Directive through the imposition of a substantially
similar moratorium, DOI is less able to rely on uniformity of policy
administration as a justification for its noncompliance with the court’s
order.31 DOI cannot assert even the few narrow policy reasons for
which courts have occasionally upheld nonacquiescence. The narrow
construction of the district court’s injunction by the Fifth Circuit in
November 2012 represents a material extension of agency power with
an equally significant potential impact on future plaintiffs absent a
See Samuel Figler, Executive Agency Nonacquiescence to Judicial Opinions, 61 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1664, 1673, 1673 n.64 (1992–1993) (referencing United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S.
286 (1970)) (“The principal justification for intracircuit nonacquiescence is that administrative
agencies must administer their programs uniformly throughout the United States.”).
27
See Maranville, infra note 67, at 493 (discussing the high volume of potential precedent for large,
national agencies whose decisions can be challenged in district court, and the difficulty high-level
administrators face in keeping track of all relevant litigation).
28
But see Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 Minn.
L. Rev. 1339, 1414–15 & n.418 (1991) (“[T]he agencies themselves can cure most problems of
nonuniformity by promptly seeking Supreme Court review and a resulting clarification of
national law.”).
29
Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of
Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 Yale L.J. 801, 813 (1990) (challenging the presumption
that nonacquiescence advances national uniformity, and underscoring that differing regional
interpretations are irrelevant to nonacquiescence analysis unless noncompliance will create
uniformity across those regions).
30
Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 630 (“The plaintiffs in this case provide a myriad of services to
support offshore oil and gas drilling, exploration, and production activities in the Gulf of Mexico’s
Outer Continental Shelf.”).
31
See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
26

182

Uncharted Waters

legislative statement from Congress.
II. Intracircuit Nonacquiescence Since Lopez v. HeckLer
Lopez,32 Stieberger,33 and Johnson,34 are a series of watershed cases
in which the federal courts harshly criticized agency attempts to
further policy in the face of adverse judicial opinions. Despite the
absence of on-point Supreme Court jurisprudence, these three cases
outline the analysis that appellate courts apply to the difficult issue
of how to reconcile competing claims of deferential treatment in the
same decision making sphere. These cases exemplify the rift between
executive administrative power and the federal judiciary, and the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Hornbeck may widen that rift even further.
Beginning with the Ninth Circuit’s 1984 decision in Lopez v.
Heckler, courts began taking more direct action to limit the ability of
administrative agencies to dictate the way they comply with judicial
orders. In Lopez, the plaintiffs brought suit challenging the system
by which the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
distributed disability benefits.35 The plaintiffs comprised a class of
workers previously eligible for disability benefits who were ineligible
under the Secretary’s new system, which remained in place despite two
California district court decisions describing the proper distribution
system for disability benefits.36 Circuit precedent required HHS to
show proof that a given recipient’s condition had improved before
terminating payment—a requirement HHS continued to disregard in
distributing benefits.37 The plaintiffs secured a preliminary injunction
mandating the reinstatement of benefits, and HHS appealed.38 Chief
Justice Rehnquist issued a partial stay regarding plaintiffs whose
benefits were denied before the Ninth Circuit’s instructive decisions
in Finnegan v. Matthews39 and Patti v. Schweiker40 became final, and the
full Supreme Court ultimately vacated and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of the Social Security Act of 1984.41
Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds Heckler v. Lopez, 469
U.S. 1082 (1984).
33
Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated sub. nom. Stieberger v. Bowen,
801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
34
Johnson v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 969 F.2d 1082, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
35
Lopez, 725 F.2d at 1493.
36
Id. at 1494–95.
37
Id. The decisions referenced in Justice Reinhardt’s opinion were Finnegan v. Matthews, 641
F.2d 1340 (9th Cir.1981), and Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982).
38
See Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 32 (C.D. Cal. 1983) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 725 F.2d 1489
(9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984).
39
641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981).
40
669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982).
41
Lopez v. Heckler, 106 F.R.D. 268, 269 (1984).
32
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Although the Supreme Court never reached the issue of whether
HHS’s policy of nonacquiescence was legal, both the district court and
Ninth Circuit opinions discuss how intracircuit nonacquiescence of the
kind described in Lopez treads on the separation of powers doctrine.42
Rather than challenge the validity of the Finnegan and Patti decisions,
which the Ninth Circuit correctly pointed out would also not be
appropriate in district court, HHS skipped the crucial step of seeking
judicial review and decided the appropriate legal conclusion for itself.43
Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lopez, the Second Circuit
was confronted with the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s)
nonacquiescence policy in Stieberger v. Heckler.44 The plaintiffs, a class
of disability beneficiaries, challenged the SSA’s practice of reviewing
disability cases by administrative law judges (ALJs).45 These judges, in
accordance with binding Second Circuit precedent, were required to
treat testimony from the claimant’s treating physician as binding on
the fact finder, there the ALJ, in accordance with the so-called “treating
physician rule.”46
The SSA refused to abide by the treating physician rule, and even
issued regulations explicitly ordering the ALJs to require substantial
evidence to support such testimony.47 The stated nonacquiescence
policy executed by the ALJs was to disregard federal court decisions
from the circuit in which they sat if they diverged from the Secretary’s
policy objectives.48 The district court noted that the SSA carried out
its nonacquiescence policy both by continuing agency initiatives
that conflicted with circuit court decisions and by issuing statements
directing agency personnel, including ALJs, not to adhere to certain
See Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 29–30 (“[G]overnmental agencies, like all individuals and other entities,
are obliged to follow and apply the law as it is interpreted by the courts.”); Lopez, 725 F.2d at 1497
(“Far from raising questions of judicial interference in executive actions, this case presents the
reverse constitutional problem: the executive branch defying the courts and undermining what
are perhaps the fundamental precepts of our constitutional system—the separation of powers and
respect for the law.”).
43
See Lopez, 725 F.2d at 1496–97 (noting that the proposition that the Social Security Act forbids
the Secretary from terminating benefits of persons she has determined to be disabled until she
comes forth with evidence of medical improvement is settled and “law of the circuit”).
44
615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated sub. nom. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1986).
45
Id. at 1321.
46
See Bowen, 801 F.2d at 31 (“The [treating physician] rule, which has been the law of this circuit
for at least five years, provides that a treating physician’s opinion on the subject of medical
disability, i.e., diagnosis and nature and degree of impairment, is: (i) binding on the fact-finder
unless contradicted by substantial evidence. . .”) (citation omitted).
47
See id. at 32 (“The [district] [c]ourt also cited regulations suggesting that a treating
physician’s opinion must be supported by clinical or laboratory findings.”) (citing (20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1526(b), 416.925(b) (1986)).
48
See id.
42
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circuit decisions.49 Although the district court ultimately vacated
the preliminary injunction for being overly broad, the SSA’s level of
compliance with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the treatment
rules at issue was critical to determining the scope of the final
injunction.50
Then, in 1992, the D.C. Circuit decided Johnson v. United States
Railroad Retirement Board,51 in which the court considered the Railroad
Retirement Board’s intracircuit nonacquiescence policy and its effect on
benefits paid to retired workers.52 For eleven years, the Board stopped
paying retirement benefits to workers after their dependent children
turned sixteen, despite language in the Railroad Retirement Act of
1974 requiring that they pay benefits until the dependent children
turned eighteen.53 Under its own interpretation of the Social Security
Act, the Board’s decisions would be insulated from class actions by
the relationship between the Railroad Act and the Social Security Act,
despite two contrary decisions from the Eighth and Eleventh circuits.54
The Johnson court called the Board’s refusal to adhere to the Eighth
Circuit’s decision “extraordinary,” and discussed several alternatives
to the intracircuit nonacquiescence that the agency neglected to explore
before litigation.55 Acknowledging the agency’s concerns for uniformity
in the application of administrative policy, the Johnson court found the
arguments for intercircuit nonacquiescence more persuasive (or less
objectionable) than the arguments for intracircuit nonacquiescence.56
Although the decisions of one circuit certainly deserve respect, the
non-binding status of foreign circuit court decisions allows issues to
“percolate” throughout the judicial system, allowing issues that produce
Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1351 (describing scope of nonacquiescence by the SSA, which includes
furthering general policies that contradict the Second Circuit’s interpretation and promulgating
regulations instructing ALJs to act directly in opposition to that interpretation).
50
Bowen, 801 F.2d at 38 (noting that failure to properly apply the Second Circuit’s interpretation
of the treating physician rule will warrant injunctive relief).
51
969 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
52
See id. at 1083.
53
Id.; see also 45 U.S.C. §§ 231–231(v) (2006).
54
See, e.g., Johnson v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 925 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1991); Costello v. U.S. R.R.
Retirement Bd., 780 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1985).
55
See Johnson, 969 F.2d at 1092 (“When an agency honestly believes a circuit court has misinterpreted
the law, there are two places it can go to correct the error: Congress or the Supreme Court. The
Railroad Retirement Board has done neither. It has not asked Congress to clarify its intentions,
even after two circuits said it had misunderstood Congress’s intentions. More remarkably, it has
failed to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari, even in the decisions it claims to believe were
wrongly decided. The Board appears, as a result, to be less interested in national uniformity than
in denying benefits one way or another.”).
56
Id. at 1093 (“[T]he arguments against inter circuit nonacquiescence, []which occurs when an
agency refuses to apply the decision of one circuit to claims that will be reviewed by another
circuit[], are much less compelling than the arguments against intra circuit nonacquiescence.”).
49
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varying results in the circuits to be resolved by the Supreme Court.57
Like the HHS policy at issue in Lopez, the Court in Johnson characterized
intracircuit nonacquiescence as an end run around judicial review,
and a normative deviation that intercircuit nonacquiescence does not
present. Finally, the D.C. Circuit noted that additional attempts to
pursue the Board’s statutory construction against repeated judicial
rejection would constitute contempt.58
These principles, when taken together, underscore the increasingly
harsh criticism that courts of appeals have extended to agencies
practicing intracircuit nonacquiescence. Yet, empirical studies have
shown that a number of federal agencies still practice nonacquiescence
in varying forms.59 Uniformity with respect to the application of a
certain agency policies has been advanced as the justification for
applying the policy despite disagreement among the circuits as to
its proper application, and when venue uncertainty or horizontal
uniformity is particularly important, courts have been even less critical
of agency nonacquiescence.60 However, none of these mitigating
factors are present in Hornbeck. By finding that DOI’s conduct did not
rise to the level of contempt, the ability of agencies to continue policy
platforms already rejected by the courts will be widened beyond venue
uncertainty and tax collection. This is a material departure from prior
treatment of nonacquiescence.
As will be more fully described in Part IV, the consequences of
nonacquiescence by federal agencies, especially in highly regulated
sectors of the economy like the offshore petroleum exploration
industry, raise persistent constitutional issues that appreciably affect
the remedies available to industry actors similar to those challenging
the DOI’s actions in Hornbeck.61

See id.
Id. (“[N]ow that three circuits have rejected the Board’s position, and not one has accepted it,
further resistance would show contempt for the rule of law.”).
59
Robert J. Hume, How Courts Impact Federal Administrative Behavior 10, 14–15 (2009); see
also Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 17, at 713 (describing the results of the authors’ “Survey of
Other Major Federal Agencies”).
60
See Raybestos Friction Materials Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1141, 1143 (No. 80–2793, 1980) (noting
that agencies with a national footprint can give rise to policies with more than one appropriate
venue for review) (internal citation omitted); Lester R. Uretz, The Chief Counsel’s Policy Regarding
Acquiescence and Nonacquiescence in Tax Court Cases, 44 Ind. L.J. 206, 215 (1969) (outlining the
Internal Revenue Service’s policy of nonacquiescence in order to effectively and uniformly
administer the tax code).
61
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
57
58
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III. The Circumstances of the Hornbeck Moratoria and DOI’s
Role
The purpose of a preliminary injunction like the one issued in
Hornbeck is “to prevent irreparable injury so as to reserve the court’s
ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits.”62 Secretary
Salazar, or his government counsel, either knew or should have known
that the Fifth Circuit would hear an appeal of the order, eliminating
the possibility that DOI’s nonacquiescence was based on uncertainty
in venue choice.63
By replacing the May 20th moratorium with a practically identical
one, and then testifying in an open Senate hearing that the moratorium
was still in effect,64 Secretary Salazar expressed clear intent to frustrate
the court’s ability to meaningfully rule on the merits by allowing the
injury65 to continue.66 Both the Secretary’s comments during the Senate
subcommittee hearing and the issuance of a substantially identical
replacement moratorium constitute intracircuit nonacquiescence. When
considered together, DOI’s actions in response to the instant injunction
frame an apparent remedies disparity that necessarily affects both
actual and potential parties that would be impacted were the agency
in question actually bound by the court-imposed obligation.67 In the
oil exploration context of Hornbeck, the impact of nonacquiescence is
especially great given that offshore drilling is a complex industry with
many similarly situated actors.68
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 627 (5th Cir. 1985); see also
Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo Cnty. Tex., Inc. v. Suehs, 828 F. Supp. 2d 872, 880 (W.D. Tex.
2012), vacated and remanded, 2012 WL 3573642 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2012).
63
See Brief for the Defendants at 2–4, Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, No. 10-30585,
696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010).
64
Senate Minerals Reorganization Hearing, supra note 7, at 21–22 (Secretary Salazar’s response
to Senator Alexander’s question about how DOI was going to proceed with the moratorium:
“Senator Alexander, we will in the weeks and months ahead take a look at how it is that the
moratorium in place might be refined . . . .”) (emphasis added).
65
Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 638–39 (E.D. La. 2010) appeal
dismissed as moot, 396 F. App’x 147 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
66
See id. (“An invalid agency decision to suspend drilling of wells in depths of over 500 feet
simply cannot justify the immeasurable effect on the plaintiffs, the local economy, the Gulf region,
and the critical present-day aspect of the availability of domestic energy in this country.”).
67
See Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of
Pluralism, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 471, 495 (1986) (“Nonacquiescence arises when an agency refuses to
abide by a court-imposed obligation. Administrative agency nonacquiescence, therefore, will
disfavor those individuals who would benefit from that obligation.”).
68
The DOI offered 21 million offshore acres for lease connected to oil exploration in 2011 alone.
As of May 2012, 10 million acres have approved exploration plans attached and 6.4 million acres
are in active production. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Oil and Gas Lease Utilization, Onshore
and Offshore–Updated Report to the President 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/
pressreleases/upload/Final-Report.pdf.
62
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One of the principal duties of DOI is to contract with oil and natural
gas companies to facilitate both offshore and onshore exploration of
these resources beneath government-owned land.69 The May Directive
ordered all lessees to stop offshore drilling efforts at depths greater
than 500 feet as soon as safely possible for a period of six months.70
After Judge Feldman issued an injunction staying the effects of the May
Directive, DOI issued a new moratorium on July 12, 2010 (hereinafter
the July Directive).71 The principal difference between the July Directive
and the May Directive is that the July Directive prohibited activity based
on drilling configurations and techniques, as opposed to prohibiting all
drilling below 500 feet.72
In the notice describing the July Directive, DOI cites several sources
of new information leading to the adjusted measure, including “[t]he
collection and analysis of key evidence regarding the potential causes
of the April 20, 2010 explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon
offshore drilling rig, including information collected by the Presidential
Commission and other investigations.”73 The merits of the Plaintiffs’
challenge to the May Directive focused on the notice and specificity
requirements that all agencies must achieve when promulgating new
policies as part of their duties under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).74 However, even though the July Directive was based on
additional industry research and consultation with experts, DOI
itself readily admits that the July Directive is largely identical to the
See generally 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (2006) (the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920); 30 U.S.C. § 351
et seq. (2006) (the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands of 1947); see also 30 U.S.C. § 21(a)
(1996) (describing federal government policy regarding the disposition of leases on federal lands,
particularly promoting efficient use of mining lands by private enterprise and the environmentally
safe disposal of waste products); Thomas v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 139 F. Supp. 588, 596 (D. Colo.
1956) (noting that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 placed all federally held oil, gas, and petroleum
lands under “the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior, to be administered by
the Secretary of the Interior.”), aff’d sub nom. Thomas v. Union Pac. R.R., 239 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.
1956).
70
Original Moratorium Notice to Lessees, available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/
upload/MORATORIUM_NTL.pdf.
71
U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Q’s and A’s New Deepwater Drilling Suspensions (July 12, 2010), available
at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=38349
(last visited Feb. 9, 2013) [hereinafter DOI Q’s and A’s]; see also John M. Broder, U.S. Issues Revised
Offshore Drilling Ban, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/
us/13commission.html; Steven Mufson, Administration Issues Revised Moratorium on Offshore
Drilling, Washington Post, July 12, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/07/12/AR2010071203003.html.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.’”).
69
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May Directive with respect to scope and duration.75 Even if DOI, in
reliance on the report of the President’s National Commission on the
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling,76 believed that
an industry work stoppage was environmentally and scientifically
necessary, that conclusion forms part of the justification for the
measure and should be published and reviewed by a court according
to the APA.77 Further, the final version of the Commission’s report was
not published until more than six months after the imposition of the
July Directive,78 so any information DOI acted on from the Commission
constituted intermediate working conclusions at best.
In response to the civil contempt finding issued by the Eastern
District of Louisiana, DOI argued it fully complied with the district
court’s order by rescinding the May Directive, and framed the July
Directive as an independent exercise of its statutory duty and power to
manage the Outer Continental Shelf under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act79 (OCSLA).80 In denying DOI’s motion to dismiss following
the issuance of the July Directive, the Eastern District of Louisiana noted
that “nearly every statement in the July 12 decision memorandum
is anticipated by documents in the May 28 record, or by documents
that were otherwise available to the Secretary before May 28.”81 After
evaluating the full range of documents produced by the parties relating
to both the May and July Directives, the court found that the decision
to issue a new moratorium was made before DOI considered any new
information.82
Issuing the July Directive, like the initial May Directive, was
a permissible action taken by DOI, and, by the plain language of
DOI’s authority to issue a Suspension of Operations, seemingly duly
authorized by statute.83 What makes Interior’s actions unreasonably
75
See DOI Q’s and A’s at A2, supra note 71 (“Like the deepwater drilling moratorium lifted by
the District Court on June 22, the deepwater drilling suspensions ordered today apply to most
deepwater drilling activities and could last through November 30.”).
76
President’s National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling,
Report to the President (January 2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf.
77
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 et seq. (2012).
78
See id.
79
Opening Brief for the Federal Defendants at 16, Hornbeck Offshore Servs. v. Salazar, No. 1130936, 2012 WL 1029835 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2012).
80
See generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331(b), 1334 (2012).
81
Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Original Brief at 14, Hornbeck Offshore Servs. v. Salazar, No. 11-30936,
2012 WL 836990 (5th Cir. Feb. 29, 2012).
82
See id. (“The record is clear, however. Immediately after this Court’s first injunction order,
the Secretary announced in public his determination to issue a new moratorium even before the
consideration of any new information.”).
83
See 30 C.F.R. § 250.172(b) (describing DOI’s statutory authority for issuing such a moratorium).
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noncompliant is that the replacement July Directive was substantially
identical to the original suspension order. The July Directive only
cured “procedural flaws”84 in the May Directive by providing more
explanatory material.85 At best, the July Directive only addressed presuit APA justification defects86 and, even if the courts take the new
information presented by Secretary Salazar at face value, the minimal
nature of that value is evinced by the equally minimal changes made
by the government in issuing the same moratorium over again.87 The
July Directive did not address Judge Feldman’s serious concerns about
the effect the May Directive would have on both the parties and the
public at large, which was a key factor in granting the injunction.88
By replacing the May Directive with a substantively identical
moratorium, Secretary Salazar committed overt intracircuit
nonacquiescence. Similar to the statements made by SSA to the ALJs in
Johnson directing the ALJs to ignore contrary circuit precedent based on
the SSA’s statutory authority, here Secretary Salazar stated to members
of Congress that the moratorium remained in place pursuant to his
executive authority.89 This statement, combined with the issuance of
a substantially identical directive just a few weeks after an injunction
stayed enforcement of the May Directive, constitutes exactly the kind
of willful continued pursuit of agency policy in the face of judicial
rejection that the nonacquiescence doctrine aims to address.

See Opening Brief for the Defendants at 7, Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F.
Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010).
85
Although not germane to the focus of this particular Article, the Fifth Circuit panel did challenge
counsel for the Federal Defendants at oral argument as to whether the information the DOI based
its moratoria on was false or misleading, and counsel admitted that based on the circumstances a
bad faith claim may have been appropriate. See Audio recording: Oral arguments in re: Hornbeck
Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, No. 11-30936 (5th Cir. Aug. 8, 2012) at 01:35–03:05, available at
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgumentRecordings.aspx.
86
See Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 638 (E.D. La. 2010) (quoting
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983)) (“[T]he
agency must ‘cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.’”).
87
See id. at 636 (noting that the APA, and not OCSLA, is the appropriate standard for judicial
review of final agency action by the Secretary in furtherance of his duties under OCSLA) (internal
citations omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2006) (the Administrative Procedure Act); 43 U.S.C.
§ 1349(a) (2006) (the citizen suit provision of OCSLA).
88
See Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. at 639 (“The effect on employment, jobs, loss of domestic energy
supplies caused by the moratorium as the plaintiffs (and other suppliers, and the rigs themselves)
lose business, and the movement of the rigs to other sites around the world will clearly ripple
throughout the economy in this region.”).
89
Senate Minerals Reorganization Hearing, supra note 7 at 28 (“[W]e will move forward with the
executive authority which I have to make sure that the moratorium does, in fact, stay in place.”)
(emphasis added).
84
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IV. Permissible Nonacquiescence or Contempt: Unpacking the
Potential Hornbeck Outcomes
In deciding the Plaintiff’s appeal in Hornbeck, the Fifth Circuit ruled
in favor of DOI and overruled the contempt finding issued by the
district court.90 At this point, the procedural posture of the case almost
makes the contempt finding irrelevant for the purposes of addressing
whether DOI’s actions constituted nonacquiescence, and what the
permissibility of those actions means for the future of agency behavior.
The Fifth Circuit panel did not rule on the merits of DOI’s refusal to
stop pursuing the “pause button” policy91 to stop drilling in the Gulf as
Judge Feldman’s order demanded; it was only charged with deciding
whether that refusal rises to the level of civil contempt.92 The narrower
scope of review highlights the problem future plaintiffs are more likely
to face if other courts follow the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in favor of DOI.
If agencies continue to act against judicial orders in circumstances
like those in Hornbeck with no penalty, then the remedies gap described
in the earlier cases will continue to plague both litigants and nonparties.93 Proponents of nonacquiescence reject a blanket ban on agency
nonacquiescence, noting that rationality review under the APA94
should be enough of a check on agency discretion without having to
resort to constitutional arguments.95 Indeed, in Hornbeck, the agency
conduct at issue was reviewed under the APA.96 If nonacquiescence is
still permissible even in light of that review, such a result will extend
well beyond proponents’ original justification for nonacquiescence.
See Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 701 F.3d 810, 818 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We conclude
that there is no clear and convincing evidence that Interior’s actions after the injunction violated
the clear terms of the injunction as drafted. Therefore, there was no civil contempt.”)
91
See Senate Minerals Reorganization Hearing, supra note 7 (“pause button” metaphor is used
throughout Sec. Salazar’s testimony).
92
See Opening Brief for the Defendants at 1, Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F.
Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010).
93
See, e.g., Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1362–63 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (describing the
arbitrariness the SSA’s nonacquiescence policy creates in allowing only parties financially able to
sustain litigation the benefit of meaningful judicial review), vacated sub nom. Stieberger v. Bowen,
801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
94
Although the Supreme Court has expressly equated agency rulemaking with legislation in
terms of what level of scrutiny courts apply during review, at least one scholar has noted that
perhaps a more stringent level of review is needed. See Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review
of Agency Rulemaking, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 419, 471 & n. 276 (2009). This Article does not attempt
to weigh in on this separate academic debate, and the word “rationality” used here is merely a
descriptor for the level of review mandated by the APA, which supporters of nonacquiescence
find to be a suitable substitute for more in-depth judicial review.
95
See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 17, at 719 (“[A]gency nonacquiescence is subject to fairly
significant checks by virtue of rationality review under the APA; therefore, such concerns should
be adequately addressed through statutory limitations on agency action, without need for resort
to the Constitution.”) (internal cross-references and citations omitted).
96
Hornbeck Offshore Servs. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 634 (E.D. La. 2010).
90
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Allowing the DOI’s substitution of the July Directive to stand, which
the Eastern District of Louisiana found to be substantially identical
to the enjoined May Directive and which DOI counsel described
as such, will create exactly the type of remedies disparity critics of
agency nonacquiescence have cautioned against for decades.97 The
APA provides for judicial review of agency behavior, and rationality
is not such a high bar that agencies will have to overextend resources
to meet it.98 Even proponents of agency nonacquiescence agree that
the APA represents a reasonable check on agency behavior,99 but the
justifications proffered by DOI for issuing the July Directive are so
woefully inadequate that allowing such behavior to stand without a
contempt finding would effectively render APA review meaningless.
As the court in Lopez correctly points out,100 the exercise of agency
power, especially by executive agencies with a more pronounced
formal connection to the executive branch, raises significant questions
about the separation of powers. As stated in the Supreme Court’s
seminal decision in Marbury v. Madison, “it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”101
This maxim is the bedrock upon which arguments against agency
nonacquiescence typically rest, and taking that argument to its logical
conclusion it follows that agencies are inappropriately taking final
statutory interpretation out of the hands of the courts by refusing to
follow judicial decisions that the agency deems are contrary to agency
policy.102 However, this happens with some frequency; courts give an
See Maranville, supra note 67, at 495, 498 (discussing how the delayed outcome in cases subject
to agency nonacquiescence results in increased costs for litigants, and how, as agencies use
nonacquiescence to insulate their actions and policies from judicial review, generally the duration
and scope of regulation increases).
98
See Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (discussing the rationality element of agency behavior
review under the APA); but see Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications
of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev.
1093, 1120 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court has delegated, to the agencies themselves, the
authority to determine the applicability of the APA).
99
See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 17 at 719; Coenen, supra note 28 at 1351 n.38 (“Professors
Estreicher and Revesz, after all, argue that the APA invites balancing in assessing the legality of
agency action and that, for example, the government’s justifications for nonacquiescence must
give way when ‘nonacquiescence is carried too far and becomes a tool for defiance of judicial
review.’”).
100
See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The distinction between independent and executive
agencies and the unique position of executive agencies with respect to the White House and its
policy agenda has been the subject of many law review articles. See, e.g., Figler, supra note 26. The
distinction is not discussed at length in this article, and is relevant only to the extent that DOI is an
executive agency and it appears that the design and execution of these moratoria involved close
collaboration with the White House. See generally Senate Minerals Reorganization Hearing, supra
note 7.
101
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
102
See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir. 1984) (summarizing the plaintiffs’ argument
that the Secretary of Health and Human Services usurped judicial authority through the agency’s
97
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agency’s interpretation of a given law considerable deference as long
as it is not clearly inconsistent with congressional intent.103
The separation of powers doctrine has also been interpreted
in support of nonacquiescence, and some commentators describe
agencies as a co-equal branch of government vested with independent
responsibility to interpret laws as provided by their authorizing and
operating statutes.104 This theory oversteps agency authority, and both
case law and the governing statutory regime make clear that district
court decisions and agency determinations are distinct, not equivalent,
terms despite serving the same function in terms of adjudicating rights
of the litigants.105 The APA clearly defines the relationship between
a reviewing court and the agency whose decision is in question, and
although there is a contextual approach leading to agency deference
in some circumstances, an understanding of agencies as a co-equal
branch alongside the judiciary simply cannot stand on solid separation
of powers grounds.106 The issues underlying the separation of powers
argument persist even in the face of serious functional difficulties that
make the issue impossible to address under the law in its present state,
notably with the lack of Supreme Court case law regarding the analytical
framework, notwithstanding whether the Court will take up the merits
of the constitutional challenges to intracircuit nonacquiescence.107
In Hornbeck, the district court determined that the APA provided
the proper standard of review for the Interior’s actions,108 and a
decision in favor of the government threatens to effectively remove
what commentators postulate is the acceptable substitute for the
constitutional challenges previously described.109 Given the weaknesses
nonacquiescence policy); accord Spraic v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 735 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.
1984).
103
See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 19, at 724 (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
104
See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979, 985 (1987)
(“[C]onstitutional interpretation is not the business of the Court only, but also properly the
business of all branches of government.”).
105
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”); Mount
Emmons Min. Co. v. Babbitt, 928 F. Supp. 1046, 1048 (D. Colo. 1996) rev’d, 117 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir.
1997) (“The [district] [c]ourt is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”)
(citations omitted).
106
See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 53 (1955) (“[T]he basic policy of the Administrative
Procedure Act to facilitate court review of such administrative action.”).
107
See Coenen, supra note 28, at 1358.
108
See Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 636 (E.D. La. 2010) (“The
Court agrees that the APA certainly applies here.”).
109
See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text; see also Coenen, supra note 28, at 1387 (advocating
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of the separation of powers argument, expanding the nonacquiescence
doctrine by removing the APA check would leave potential plaintiffs to
fight transgressions by the modern administrative state with the legal
equivalent of stone knives and bearskins.
Recommendations and Conclusion
Although the Fifth Circuit’s decision regarding the civil contempt
order in Hornbeck did not meaningfully resolve the DOI’s actions
regarding the successive moratoria, the Fifth Circuit’s reversal of
sanctions against DOI for its conduct sent a clear message to the
agency community that DOI’s actions were reasonable. Here, DOI
was not motivated by venue uncertainty or a desire to more uniformly
apply agency policy.110 Rather, it seems DOI simply thought its
policy was scientifically supported and environmentally necessary.111
Weighing those concerns cannot fall to the agency implementing the
policy in question, especially without meaningful and independent
judicial review. Some independent adjudicatory agencies, like the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), have statutory authority allowing
them to assess the rights of litigants in dispute resolution processes
similar to courts, but this is not an authority DOI enjoys.112
Without definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, differing
treatment of agency nonacquiescence policies will lead to both a lack
of horizontal uniformity and vertical uniformity. If different circuits
continue treating agency nonacquiescence policies with varying
degrees of scrutiny, agencies operating in multiple jurisdictions without
authorizing statutes that limit venue choice can effectively ignore
unfavorable outcomes. For example, the SSA can choose to continue
applying a policy that the Ninth Circuit has disallowed to similarly
situated potential plaintiffs in the Eighth Circuit. This scenario, while
seemingly inequitable on its face, has been generally accepted under
for judicial use of an ends/means analysis to address the difficulties of the separation of powers
implications presented by intracircuit nonacquiescence); The Honorable Joseph F. Weis, Jr.,
Agency Non-Acquiescence-Respectful Lawlessness or Legitimate Disagreement?, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
845, 849 (1987) (“The friction between the courts and administrative agencies is not based on
personalities . . . . Rather, the dispute is an institutional one, and has its roots, as I indicated earlier,
in the separation of powers doctrine, a basic premise in our constitutional theory of government.”).
110
See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
111
See DOI Q’s and A’s, supra note 71 (“The Secretary has concluded new suspensions are
necessary because he has determined that new deepwater drilling would pose a threat of serious,
irreparable, or immediate harm or damage to the marine, coastal, and human environment.”).
112
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012) (noting the enforcement mechanisms available to the EEOC
in its capacity to adjudicate unfair labor practices); 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2012) (describing the
EPA Administrator’s enforcement authority to issue penalty orders against private actors for
violations).
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the aegis of the circuit courts’ ability to interpret the law in their own
circuits, and the benefit of allowing disagreement to percolate among
the circuits before review by the Supreme Court.113
The circumstances of Hornbeck also threaten to disturb vertical
uniformity, which should theoretically remain unaffected by the ability
of circuit courts to interpret the same agency provision differently.
Practically, it is easiest to imagine these consequences using the facts
of Hornbeck. If DOI is allowed to disregard the district court’s 2010
injunction and continue administering its offshore drilling moratoria
without penalty, as the Fifth Circuit’s decision seems to indicate,
all similarly situated industry actors within the Fifth Circuit will be
denied the same compensation as the plaintiffs in the instant case. This
will force similarly situated, but unrepresented, actors to bear the costs
associated with DOI’s most recent moratorium, even though the court
has already granted injunctive relief against what is undisputedly a
“substantially identical”114 moratorium.
Allowing this kind of nonacquiescence in the absence of venue
uncertainty not only creates a separation of powers issue, but it also
functionally deprives any similarly situated non-parties of the ability
to litigate their claims. Allowing the agency in question to continue
enforcing its policies despite the efforts of other litigants to secure a
judgment condemning those same policies, improperly insulates the
agency activity from judicial review. This kind of operational impunity
with respect to policy implementation is the essence of nonacquiescence,
and without direction from the Supreme Court or Congress, agencies
will continue to test the limits of their discretion to the detriment of any
potential or actual plaintiffs seeking to challenge that agency in court.
The theoretical and practical concerns raised by this Article
following the Fifth Circuit’s recent opinion could also be addressed
by Congress in an attempt to legislatively define the parameters by
which agencies can continue to act in the presence of an adverse court
decision. Indeed, legislative action may be the best option to change the
pattern of agency behavior without a clear directive from the Supreme
Court, which itself recognizes instances in which courts should defer to
agency interpretations of statutes where Congress has delegated, even
implicitly, the power to interpret to that agency.115
113
Johnson v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 969 F.2d 1082, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[T]here is an
additional value to letting important legal issues ‘percolate’ throughout the judicial system, so the
Supreme Court can have the benefit of different circuit court opinions on the same subject.”).
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See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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The APA defines what agency actions are reviewable and the
scope by which that review takes place, and even incorporates an
analogue to the common law writ of mandamus, giving reviewing
courts the power to compel agency action that is “unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed.”116 The APA at least conceives of the power
relationship between reviewing elements of the judiciary and agency
decisions, and Congress could amend the existing framework to bring
nonacquiescence in line with the mainstream relationship between
these two government policymaking engines without significantly
widening the scope of that relationship.
From concrete, high court judicial guidance to legislative changes
to the APA, this Article suggests several ways to curtail the extension
of agency discretion underlying the Fifth Circuit’s recent ruling in
Hornbeck. No matter which option lawmakers ultimately take, the
outcome in Hornbeck represents a significant change from historical
limits placed on agency nonacquiescence, and makes the future of
certain agency interactions with judicial orders unclear.
While nonacquiescence is typically resolved at the appellate level,
its impacts are strongest and most immediate at the trial level. In the
Hornbeck litigation, DOI’s reaction to the district court’s order resulted
in a contempt finding that was immediately appealed. In the interim,
it forced the plaintiffs to continue litigating and comply with DOI’s
moratorium, both which resulted in tremendous additional expense.
This manifestation of the power imbalance inherent in nonacquiescence
doctrine today is not unique to Hornbeck.
In 2010, the Seventh Circuit recognized in Doctor’s Nursing &
Rehab Center v. Sebelius that allowing HHS to reopen administrative
proceedings regarding the underlying claim supporting the plaintiffs’
civil suit would allow the agency to manipulate federal jurisdiction
midstream, and greatly increase the time and financial costs of the
litigation in addition to preventing the actual impact of unfavorable
precedent.117 This course of action by HHS is technically authorized
by its operating statute, which itself is a delegation of authority from
Congress, and under the APA its exercise is subject to high deference
or, if discretionary, may even be unreviewable.118 The Seventh Circuit
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012).
See Doctors Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 613 F.3d 672, 679 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Besides being
highly inefficient, it would allow the agency to manipulate federal jurisdiction to frustrate litigants
by increasing the time and expense required to pursue claims, and prevent or at least postpone
into perpetuity unfavorable precedent.”).
118
See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988) (holding that termination decisions are
discretionary decisions made by the CIA Director and therefore unreviewable under the APA).
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had to look to the statutory construction of a section of the Medicare
Act addressing the procedure for remand by courts to infer limits on
agencies’ own authority to reopen proceedings.119 The action taken by
HHS in Sebelius is a perfect example of an otherwise-duly authorized
right granted to an agency that, if insulated from proper judicial
review by the shield of nonacquiescence, would allow the agency an
unreasonable amount of discretion in determining both the course and
substantive effect of litigation against the agency.
Through interpreting the APA and the Supreme Court cases, which
establish high levels of deference, appellate courts are necessarily
constrained in dealing with the outer limits of agency independence. By
couching the remedy and analysis for nonacquiescence as exclusively
appellate, as the Fifth Circuit and others have, agencies have carte
blanche to manipulate courts’ jurisdiction and plaintiffs’ finances at
the district court level with minimal ultimate penalty. Congress should
legislate the proper boundaries for agency activity contrary to adverse
judicial orders. If given the proper guidelines, courts could properly
interpret Congress’ intent with respect to specific situations. At present,
having to resort to inferences from statutes not directly on point, as
was the case in Sebelius,120 may help resolve individual cases but does
not address the overall problem. Further, if the Fifth Circuit panel in
Hornbeck is a representative example of circuit courts nationally, they
may not even want to address this difficult question. Rather than
uphold the district court’s contempt finding against DOI, the panel
construed the terms of the injunction so narrowly that it eviscerated
the substantive preventative interest that was at the heart of Judge
Feldman’s original order.121 For these reasons, a legislative approach
seems to be the best option for a clear and uniform resolution. As the
Fifth Circuit itself proclaimed in 1993 in deciding a case involving
Employee Retirement Income Security Act benefits, “as Congress
giveth, Congress taketh away.”122

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012).
See generally 613 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2010).
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Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 701 F.3d 810, 823–24 (5th Cir. 2012) (Elrod, J.,
dissenting) (“In essence, the majority opinion suggests that a litigant can undermine and avoid a
district court’s order, provided that it does not, as a very technical matter, engage in activity that
the order expressly prohibits.”)
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See NGS Am., Inc. v. Barnes, 998 F.2d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1993).
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